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LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SPECTRUM
WARS: VIEWS ON THE UNITED STATES'
EFFORT GOING INTO AND COMING OUT




Every three to four years, nations assemble for the World Radiocommunica-
tion Conference ("WRC" or "Conference") to consider important measures
that ensure the effective and orderly worldwide use of the radiofrequency spec-
trum needed for myriad forms of wireless communication.' The WRC reviews
and revises international administrative regulations, which contain detailed
provisions governing the use of both the finite amount of available radiofre-
quency spectrum and the limited number of satellite orbital slots.2 The most
recent gathering, known as WRC-07, took place in Geneva, Switzerland, from
October 22, 2007 to November 16, 2007. There, under the auspices of the In-
I Donna Coleman Gregg served in the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the
Executive Office of the President as the Senior Policy Advisor to the United States Ambas-
sador to the 2007 World Radio Communication (WRC-07) and was a member of the U.S.
Delegation to the Conference. Prior to her work on WRC-07, she was Chief of the FCC
Media Bureau. Before entering public service, Ms. Gregg served as Vice President of Legal
and Regulatory Affairs and General Counsel of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and
also as a communications attorney in private law practice. She currently is a Visiting Profes-
sor in the Institute for Communications Law Studies at the The Catholic University of
America Columbus School of Law.
I INT'L TELECOMM. UNION CONST. art. 13, §§ 1-2, available at
http://www.itu.int/net/about/basic-texts/constitution/chapterii.aspx.
2 Id. § 1; see JAMES G. SAVAGE, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION
COMMUNICATIONS REGULATION 16 (1989).
3 Hamadoun I. Tour6, Editorial, Sharing Finite Resources, ITU NEWS, Oct. 2007,
available at http://www.itu.int/itunews/manager/display.asp?lang--en&year=2007&issue =
08&ipage = editorial&ext=-html.
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ternational Telecommunication Union ("ITU" or "Union"), a U.S. delegation
of 157 engineers, technical experts, spectrum managers, diplomats, and law-
yers joined counterparts from 161 other ITU Member States to consider the
twenty-nine items on the conference agenda.'
By opening spectrum for deployment of advanced wireless broadband tech-
nologies-such as Worldwide Interoperability Microwave Access ("Wi-
MAX") 5-- and promoting innovation and improvement of communications
services for important purposes, WRC-07 affected the daily lives of people not
only in the United States, but also around the world. Among the important pur-
poses served by these communications services are aircraft and maritime op-
erations, weather monitoring and forecasting, space research and exploration,
national defense, and emergency and disaster response.6 Such matters, and the
issues under consideration at other recent Conferences, have pitted the interests
of developing nations against industrialized nations, emerging against incum-
bent technologies, terrestrial against space communications, active against pas-
sive services, and one region of the world against another.7 Thus, the WRC-07
agenda challenged delegates to strike a balance among competing needs for
radiofrequency spectrum and satellite orbital slots.
With so much at stake, the events in Geneva generated worldwide interest
throughout the halls of government, corporate boardrooms, and consumer
households. As with previous Conferences, the deliberations that took place at
4 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNITED STATES DELEGATION REPORT: WORLD
RADIOCOMMUNICATION CONFERENCE 2007 64 apps. A, C (2008),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/I08955.pdf [hereinafter WRC-07
DELEGATION REPORT].
5 See PHILIPPE LAINE, CHRISTOPHE BOSCHER, DIETRICH BOETrLE & LAURANCE FEIJT,
WIMAX: MAKING UBIQUITOUS HIGH-SPEED DATA SERVICES A REALITY 1 (2004), available
at http://www 1 .alcatel-lucent.com/publications/abstract.jhtml?repositoryltem--tcm: 172-
44851635 ("Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) is the common
name associated to the IEEE 802.16a/REVd/e standards .... WiMAX can offer very high
data rates and extended coverage."); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N STAFF REPORT, MUNICI-
PAL PROVISION OF WIRELESS INTERNET 9 (2006), http://www.fic.gov/
os/2006/10/V060021 municipalprovwirelessintemet.pdf (noting that WiMax's capabilities of
wireless data rates of up to 75 Mpbs and coverage areas of over thirty miles make the stan-
dard superior to Wi-Fi technology).
6 WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-6, app. A; see also Victoria Shan-
non, U.N. Agency Gives Boost to WiMax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2007, at C8; Laura Macln-
nis, Radio Spectrum Division Seen Spurring Innovation, REUTERS, Nov. 16, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/idUSL 1623521620071116.
7 See JENNIFER A. MANNER, SPECTRUM WARS: THE POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY DEBATE
16-21 (2003); see also, e.g., Bob Brewin, The Battle for Spectrum, GOV'T COMPUTER NEWS,
Mar. 12, 2007, http://gcn.com/articles/2007/03/07/The-battle-for-spectrum.aspx (describing
how policymakers must manage the allocation of spectrum for both emerging technologies
and older uses of the spectrum); Kevin J. O'Brien, Who Gets the Digital Dividend of UHF?,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 13, 2007, at 15 (discussing the prospect of the ITU deciding to
reallocate portions of the broadcast television spectrum for wireless broadband services).
[Vol. 17
Lessons Learned from the Spectrum Wars
WRC-07--especially the outcome of a number of marquee agenda
items--received wide coverage by both the international and U.S. press.8
While events taking place during the Conference in Geneva attracted a great
deal of attention, far less notice was paid to what happened behind the scenes
leading into and coming out of the WRC. For the United States, the largely
unheralded efforts leading up to and following a WRC can determine whether
the United States achieves its spectrum objectives and maintains its position as
a world technology leader.
This Article examines ITU World Radiocommunication Conferences, which
are the predominant mechanisms for formulating global standards governing
highly technical and complex matters concerning the use of radiofrequency
spectrum. With a focus on efforts leading up to a WRC, the Article explores
how the United States' objectives, proposals, and strategies are and should be
developed. The Article also identifies opportunities for the U.S. private sector
to provide input and participate in the work of this international forum. Parts II
and III provide background on the ITU and WRC and introduce the process by
which ITU Member States join together to assimilate information and update
the ITU's Radio Regulations. Part IV addresses pre-conference preparations
that the United States undertakes on the international and domestic levels in
the period leading up to a WRC and considers recommendations for improving
several troublesome aspects of those processes.
In Part V the focus shifts to the period immediately following a WRC and
the work of translating the Conference results into U.S. law. That post-
conference task has long been a problem, causing treaties resulting from
WRCs to languish without ratification by the United States for many years.
Part V also appraises an important recent U.S. Senate action to move pending
and future ITU treaties forward more expeditiously, benefiting not only federal
government spectrum users, but also the U.S. telecommunications industry,
citizens, and consumers.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE ITU AND WORLD
RADIOCOMMUNICATION CONFERENCES
A. The ITU
The ITU evolved from one of the world's earliest attempts at forming an in-
tergovernmental entity comparable to modern international organizations.'
8 WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-6, app. J (listing of select press
accounts of the Conference).
9 See generally ITU's History, http://www.itu.int/net/about/history.aspx (last visited
Jan. 30, 2009) [hereinafter ITU's History] (detailing the genesis of the ITU); see also
20091
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
During the 1830s, the invention of the electric telegraph made possible the in-
stantaneous transmission of information between distant government outposts
and commercial centers." Initially, however, the lack of technical standardiza-
tion in neighboring countries impeded the quick and seamless transmission of
telegraphic messages directly from one country to another across national bor-
ders." In 1849, the adoption of common standards by Austria and Prussia be-
came a first step in removing the barriers to attainment of telegraphy's full po-
tential as a mode of international communication.' 2 Other European countries
soon followed suit, signing the convention that established the International
Telegraph Union at the Paris Telegraph Conference. 3
As new technologies emerged and expanded during the second half of the
nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, the International Tele-
graph Union engaged in international coordination of telephony and wireless
telegraphy as well as ordinary telegraphy. 4 During the first decade of the twen-
tieth century, international meetings in Berlin, Germany resulted in the adop-
tion of a Radiotelegraph Convention and the creation of an International Ra-
diotelegraph Union-an informal body that met in periodic conferences to de-
velop international regulations for use of the radiofrequency spectrum." The
two merged following a 1932 Conference of the telegraph and radio unions in
Madrid, becoming the International Telecommunication Union. 6 The merger
reflected the emergence of new technologies and the expansion of the groups'
focus and responsibilities. 7 In 1947, the ITU became a specialized agency of
the United Nations.'
8
Since its creation, continuing advances in technology increased the ITU's
importance as a forum for facilitating international telecommunication. In the
field of radiocommunication, rapid technological progress led to increased po-
GEORGE A. CODDING, JR. & ANTHONY M. RUTKOWSKI, THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNI-
CATION UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD 3 (1982) (noting that the history of the ITU's forma-
tion can serve as a history for all international organizations).
10 See ANTHONY R. MICHAELIS, FROM SEMAPHORE TO SATELLITE 25 (1965).
11 See CODDING & RUTKOWSKI, supra note 9, at 4-5.
12 See MICHAELIS, supra note 10, at 45-48.
B3 CODDING & RUTKOWSKI, supra note 9, at 6.
14 ITU's History, supra note 9.
'5 MICHAELIS, supra note 10, at 143, 146.
16 CODDING & RUTKOWSKI, supra note 9, at 18.
17 Id.
18 ITU's History, supra note 9. United Nations specialized agencies are autonomous
organizations linked to the U.N. through special agreements. In addition to the ITU, these
include the International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO"), International Monetary
Fund ("IMF"), World Health Organization ("WHO"), World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion ("WIPO"), and the World Bank Group, among others. See United Nations, UN in Brief:
The Specialized Agencies, http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/agencies.htm (last visited
Jan. 27, 2009).
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tential for harmful interference among the many new services occupying the
frequency spectrum and the growing number of nations using the spectrum.' 9
In addition, new developments in space science and satellite communications
led to ITU involvement in the coordination of space communication systems
and earth stations. °
Today's ITU is the pre-eminent global forum for telecommunications and
the dominant international organization for spectrum coordination and regula-
tion.2' The ITU is made up of three organizational sectors, including the Radio-
communications Sector.2 Each sector meets periodically to discuss issues af-
fecting the particular sector, and appropriately review or revise any regulations
affecting that sector.
B. World Radiocommunication Conferences
The ITU is a periodic international organization that carries out its essential
functions through conferences. The Plenipotentiary Conference is the Union's
governing body; it also serves as the Union's principal policy-making body. 23
It convenes every four years to determine the Union's general policy goals,
elect its leadership, and establish strategic and financial plans.24
In contrast with a Plenipotentiary Conference, a World Radiocommunica-
tion Conference ("WRC") is convened within the ITU's Radiocommunication
Sector. The principal focus of a WRC is to review and revise the international
radio regulations--the part of the ITU administrative regulations comprising
the international table of frequency allocations as well as technical, procedural,
and operating rules governing use of the spectrum and satellite orbital posi-
19 See CODDING & RuTKOwsKI, supra note 9, at 46-47.
20 See RITA LAURIE WHITE & HAROLD M. WHITE, JR., THE LAW AND REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL SPACE COMMUNICATION 112-15 (1988); see also CODD1NG & RUTKOWSKI,
supra note 9, at 47.
21 See generally Kathleen Q. Abernathy, Why the World Radiocommunication Confer-
ence Continues to Be Relevant Today, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 287, 289 (2004) (discussing the
role of the ITU, including "managing the world's radio frequency spectrum and satellite
orbits"); see also Treaties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong.
(2008) (statement of Sen. Robert Menendez). The ITU has a biennial budget of 322,603,000
Swiss francs (equivalent roughly to 282,836,226 American dollars) and a staff of 822 inter-
national civil servants from eighty different countries. The most current ITU budget and
staff figures are reported from 2008-2009 and 2006, respectively. About ITU: Budget
2008-2009, http://www.itu.int/net/about/budget/2008.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2009); Ca-
reers and Recruitment: Working for the ITU, http://www.itu.int/employment (last visited
Jan. 29, 2009).
22 INT'L TELECOMM. UNION CONST. art. 7. The other two sectors are Telecommunication
Standardization ("ITU-T") and Telecommunication Development ("ITU-D"). Id.
23 Id. at arts. 7, 8.
24 Id. at art. 8.
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tions." The radio regulations amplify the provisions of the ITU Constitution
and the Convention. 6 As stipulated by the ITU Constitution, the Constitution,
Convention, and Radio Regulations all have treaty status.27
After a series of international and regional conferences produced extensive
regulations to keep pace with the progression of radio technology, a 1959 Ad-
ministrative Radio Conference in Geneva completely revised the radio regula-
tions that had accumulated during the preceding years." While WRCs that took
place from the 1960s through the 1980s generally focused on specific ser-
vices--such as space radiocommunication in 1963 and direct broadcast satel-
lites in 1987 29-- more recent Conferences have had more wide-ranging agen-
das.3" Continuing advances in radio technology and the increase in the number
of emerging nations that have become ITU Member States also have contrib-
uted to the number and complexity of ITU radio regulations, which currently
occupy four volumes totaling more than 2000 pages.3 The radio regulations
are adopted pursuant to established procedures, but leadership and cooperation
also have an impact on the regulations' content and effectiveness.
1II. MECHANICS OF THE ITU PROCESS FOR FORMULATING RADIO
REGULATIONS AT A WRC
The ITU Rules of Procedure for Conferences, Assemblies, and Meetings of
the Union ("General Rules") contain procedures describing how each Confer-
ence carries out its responsibilities. 2 Each WRC opens and concludes with a
25 See id. at art. 13, §1. A WRC also has authority to deal with questions of a worldwide
character "within its competence and related to its agenda" and to carry out other duties
specified in the ITU Constitution. Id.
26 Id. at art. 4.
27 Id. ("[T]his Constitution and the Convention are further complemented by those of
the Administrative Regulations, enumerated below, which regulate the use of telecommuni-
cations and shall be binding on all Member States ... ").
28 See CODDING & RUTKOWSKI, supra note 9, at 33-34.
29 See WHITE & WHITE, supra 20, at 116-19, 192-94.
30 This change came about as a decision of the 1989 Nice Additional Plenipotentiary
Conference in order to make the ITU better able to respond to rapid changes in technology.
Note also that prior to the 1992 ITU reforms, World Radiocommunication Conferences
were known as "World Administrative Radio Conferences." See Audrey L. Allison, Meeting
the Challenges of Change: The Reform of the International Telecommunication Union, 45
FED. COMM. L.J. 491, 510-13, 524-25 (1993) (discussing the former World Administrative
Radio Conferences and the 1992 reforms leading to the present structure and function of the
WRC).
31 In the past two decades, twenty-eight nations have joined the ITU as Member States.
ITU States Membership List, http://www.itu.int/cgi-bin/htsh/mm/scripts/mm.list
?_search=ITUstates&_languageid=l (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
32 Int'l Telecomm. Union, Rules of Procedure of Conferences, Assemblies and Meet-
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plenary meeting at which all accredited delegates to the Conference assemble;
additional plenary meetings take place throughout the month-long Conference
where final resolutions and recommendations on the various agenda items are
adopted.33 Three unique characteristics of a WRC--the conference agenda,
conference structure and leadership, and the role of consensus--have a major
influence on the Conference outcome.
A. The Conference Agenda
The ITU Convention provides for the general scope of a WRC agenda to be
established four to six years in advance of the WRC and for the final agenda to
be approved by the ITU Council with concurrence of the Membership, pref-
erably two years before the Conference.34 In keeping with this schedule, each
WRC makes preliminary recommendations for the subsequent Conference.35
To a great extent, these recommendations are based on proposed future agenda
items submitted to the WRC as country or regional proposals.36
Agenda setting for Conferences is a very sensitive and time-consuming pro-
cedure. Thus, while the ITU's General Rules for Conferences permit addition
of items to an agenda at any time prior to or even during the WRC,37 such last
minute additions-especially additions that are neither urgent nor construc-
tive-generally should be avoided. Not only do late additions allow insuffi-
cient time for thorough preparation, but they also tend to upset sensitive com-
promises reached on other agenda items, and may ultimately cause an already
long and complicated conference agenda to become unmanageable. Moreover,
adding an item to the pre-established agenda can be difficult; the submitting
delegation must have the support of at least one other delegation. 8 Even if the
agenda is certain and the issues to be resolved are clear, the success of each
Conference depends on its structure and leadership.
ings, reprinted in COLLECTION OF THE BASIC TEXTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNI-
CATION UNION ADOPTED BY THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE, ch. II [hereinafter ITU
Rules of Procedure].
33 Id. §§ 10, 15.
34 INT'L TELECOMM. UNION, Convention of the International Telecommunication Union,
art. 7, § 2 (2007), reprinted in COLLECTION OF THE BASIC TEXTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATION UNION ADOPTED BY THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE 74 (2007)
[hereinafter ITU CONVENTION]. The ITU Council is a body elected by the Plenipotentiary
Conference to facilitate implementation of provisions of the ITU Constitution and Conven-
tion as well as its Administrative Regulations and the decisions of various ITJ Conferences
and meetings. Id. at art. 4.35 Id. at art. 7 § 4.
36 See WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, app. A.
37 See ITU Rules of Procedure, supra note 32, at arts. 8, 16-18.
38 See id. at art. 18 § l.
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B. Conference Structure and Leadership
Selection of the Conference leadership and establishment of the Conference
structure can be some of the most important actions a WRC takes. The Confer-
ence Chairman has authority to schedule and adjourn meetings and to rule on
procedural motions that can shape the deliberations; consequently he or she
wields considerable influence over the conduct and potentially the outcome of
the Conference.39 While major actions and decisions occur in the plenary meet-
ings, most of the work of the Conference-including both administrative tasks
and preliminary deliberation on present and future agenda items--takes place
in Conference committees and their subsidiary bodies." Thus, the issues of
Conference leadership and committee structure typically are debated and
agreed upon well before the Conference begins to ensure speedy approval at
the Conference's opening plenary session."
The host country of a WRC normally supplies the Chairman; however, when
a Conference takes place in Switzerland-as it has for the last two WRCs as
well as for other previous Conferences-the Chairman is selected from the
ITU's world regions on a rotating basis.42 When the rotation system applies and
the Chairman must be chosen from a world region, the power and prestige of
the office can attract a number of candidates. The result can be a lengthy and
hotly contested selection process that can consume valuable conference time,
generate discord among the delegations, and ultimately doom the Conference
to failure.43 Conversely, timely selection of a fair-minded, capable Chairman
helps ensure the Conference's success."
Each WRC establishes a structure that divides responsibility for the entire
slate of items on the Conference agenda among several committees and their
respective subsidiary bodies. 5 Typically, a great deal of negotiation and effort
at the committee and working group levels takes place in order to bring final
proposals to the plenary meeting for adoption. Thus, an effective pre-
39 See id. at art. 11. The initial plenary meeting also approves the vice chairmen of the
Conference. Id. at art. 10 § 4(a).
40 See id. at art. 12 § 2.
41 See id. at art. 10.
42 See id.; see also WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 18.
43 See, e.g., WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 18 (describing the difficulty
in establishing Conference leadership for WRC-07, ultimately resulting in the Chairman
being chosen the day before the Conference began).
44 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNITED STATES DELEGATION REPORT, WORLD RADIO-
COMMUNICATION CONFERENCE 2003 12, 27-28 (2003), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/ib/docs/WRC03DelReport final [hereinafter WRC-03 DELEGATION RE-
PORT] (describing how, despite a "densely packed agenda" for WRC-2003, the Chairman
lead the Conference to a resolution of all agenda items).
45 See, e.g., WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at app. K (listing committees
from WRC-07).
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conference effort to achieve equitable division of agenda items among the
committees contributes significantly to a successful Conference outcome.
Committee and Conference leadership also play a major role in guiding this
work to a productive conclusion. If a working group has difficulty reaching
consensus on a proposal, the working group chairman may appoint a small
group of its members to find a path forward. If the working group is still un-
able to devise a proposed course of action, the chairman of the committee of
which the working group is a part may remove the matter from the group and
attempt to resolve open issues at the committee level.' When prospects for
completing work on an agenda item at the committee level appear particularly
bleak, the Conference Chairman sometimes removes the matter from the com-
mittee and convenes delegation heads and Conference leadership to reach a
consensus. Whatever approach is taken, the resulting recommended action
moves on to the Editorial Committee, which ensures that the final drafting and
translation into five languages has not substantively altered the intended out-
come.47 After several readings of the action at a plenary meeting, the Confer-
ence takes final action.48 Final action, however, may never occur without indi-
vidual committees reaching consensus on the terms of the agreement.
C. The Role of Consensus
Under the ITU Constitution's voting provisions, each Member State nor-
mally is entitled to a single vote. 9 The voting process can be time-consuming
and extremely divisive; therefore, Conference leaders generally seek to avoid
taking a vote at all costs and instead pursue consensus at every level from
working group to final adoption by the plenary." In light of the ITU's lack of
active enforcement authority," achieving consensus also is important because
46 ITU Rules of Procedure, supra note 32, arts. 11-12.
47 See id. art. 12(3).
48 Id. art. 27.
49 INT'L TELECOMM. UNION CONST. art. 3 § 2(b). Countries that are not current in pay-
ments to the Union or that have not deposited an instrument of acceptance to the ITU Con-
stitution lose the right to vote. A Member State also can obtain a second vote by holding
another country's proxy. Id. art. 28, § 9; art. 52 § 2.
50 In his opening remarks at WRC-07, ITU Secretary General Hamadoun Tour6 accu-
rately predicted, "We will make this conference succeed with the art of compromise. This
art of compromise is not new in this organization. I have no doubt that, together, despite the
very high issues that are at stake for this conference, we will succeed." Hamadoun I. Tour6,
Sec'y Gen., Int'l Telecomm. Union, Opening Remarks at the 2007 ITU World Readiocom-
munication Conference (Oct. 22, 2007), available at http://www.itu.int/net/ITU-
SG/speeches/2007/oct.22.aspx; see also MANNER, supra note 7, at 85 (noting that "most
allocations are determined based on compromises among the member states").




it can increase the likelihood of Member States' voluntary compliance with
measures adopted by the Conference. The technical complexity of many pro-
posals and the frequent presence of strongly conflicting views make crafting
successful compromises difficult and can lead to round-the-clock negotiating
and drafting sessions. For particularly high-stakes or contentious agenda items,
the pursuit of consensus often extends into the final days, and in some cases,
the final hours of the Conference.52 If consensus on a particular agenda item
eludes the Conference altogether, postponing the matter for further study and
consideration at a future Conference may provide the best option.
The Conference makes decisions on individual agenda items in periodic ple-
nary sessions throughout the month. 3 These measures, which are recorded in
the Conference's Final Acts, revise the Radio Regulations, make new spectrum
allocations, and adopt related regulatory provisions, resolutions, and recom-
mendations. 4 Even if the Conference generally achieves consensus on a meas-
ure, the ITU Convention permits delegations to make declarations and reserva-
tions at the end of the Conference regarding anything in a Conference decision
that would prevent their respective governments from agreeing to be bound
unconditionally by a given measure.5 These unique WRC characteristics that
influence Conference outcomes are necessarily a major focus for U.S. partici-
pation in WRCs both during the period of preparation leading up to a WRC
and at the Conference itself.
IV. U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE WRC'S FORMULATION OF NEW
AND REVISED INTERNATIONAL RADIO REGULATIONS
Effective U.S. participation at WRCs requires thorough knowledge of the is-
sues raised in each agenda item, an understanding of the various proposals un-
der consideration, and well-conceived negotiating strategies for attaining U.S.
objectives. U.S. WRC participants and those who observe and evaluate their
52 See, e.g., Frank Jordans, TV Spectrum Opening for Wireless Devices, Fox NEWS,
Nov. 16, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendlywires/2007Nov 16/
0,4675,UNBandwidthBattle,00.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2009). WRC-07 voted on Novem-
ber 15, 2007 to adopt a rule that would give wireless communications providers part of the
broadcast spectrum. Id. The Conference ended on November 16, 2007. See WRC-07 Dele-
gation Report, supra note 4, at ii.
13 See, e.g., WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 24, 48, 49, 50, 56 (describ-
ing different agenda items approved by the plenary).
54 See Int'l Telecomm. Union, Conference Publications, http://www.itu.int/publ/R-
ACT/en (last visited Feb. 3, 2009).
55 ITU CONVENTION, supra note 34, art. 32B § 3. Delegations also can make declara-
tions or statements, which, together with reservations, are collectively known as protocol
statements. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 313 (1986). At WRC-07, the United States submitted five declarations and reservations.
WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at app L.
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performance generally agree that good preparation is the key to a successful
Conference. 6 Accordingly, effective preparation demands and deserves several
years of intense effort during the period leading up to a Conference. For the
United States, advance preparation for a WRC involves a complex multi-
agency, multi-party effort involving both government officials and experts
from the private sector. 7 Throughout the preparatory phase of the WRC cycle,
the United States simultaneously engages in preparations on both international
and national levels, with developments in international and domestic prepara-
tions inextricably intertwined. Each will be dealt with separately and in turn.
A. U.S. Participation in Pre-conference International Preparation
Effective preparation for WRCs on the international level always has been
important for the United States. While the United States traditionally has the
largest delegation at WRCs 8 the possibility that the ITU's one-vote-per-
country voting process might be invoked has required the United States to cul-
tivate allies and build coalitions in order to achieve its WRC objectives. 9 As a
result, U.S. international preparation for WRCs has become even more signifi-
cant in recent years, as the size and influence of delegations of emerging tech-
56 See, e.g., U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, THE 1992 WORLD ADMINISTRA-
TIVE RADIO CONFERENCE: TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 162 (1993) ("[G]ood
preparation is the key to a successful conference."); see also WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT,
supra note 4, at 12 ("The U.S. Delegation's success at WRC-07 resulted in large part from
thorough preparation directed toward producing strong and unified positions, crafting sound
proposals, understanding the positions and objectives of other nations and regions, and
building strong regional and global coalitions."); FED. COMMC'NS COMM., INT'L BUREAU,
ASSESSMENT OF FCC's PREPARATORY PROCESS FOR THE 2003 WORLD RADIOCOMMUNCIA-
TION CONFERENCE (2004), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ib/wrc-
07/docs/WRCREPORT_FINAL.pdf (discussing the FCC's preparation ahead of WRC-07).
17 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NAT'L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN.,
WORLD RADIOCOMMUNICATION CONFERENCES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES PREPARATORY PROCESS 1-2 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 NTIA RECOM-
MENDATION] (discussing summarily the preparatory process for WRC-03 and the parties
involved).
58 ITU Member States with the largest delegations at WRC-07 included: (1) United
States (157 delegates); (2) Republic of Korea (97 delegates); (3) France (95 delegates); (4)
People's Republic of China (82 delegates); (5) Russian Federation (74 delegates); (6) Japan
(63 delegates); (7) United Kingdom (62 delegates). See International Telecommunication
Union, World Radiocommunication Conference, Final List of Participants 32-40, 55-63,
90-110, 156-62, 202-20 (2007) [hereinafter WRC-07 Participants List]. The U.S. sent 167
delegates to WRC-03, 162 to WRC-2000, and 105 to WRC-97. See WRC-03 DELEGATION
REPORT, supra note 44, at iii; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNITED STATES DELEGATION REPORT,
2000 WORLD RADIOCOMMUNICATION CONFERENCE 3 (2001) [hereinafter WRC-2000 DELE-
GATION REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNITED STATES DELEGATION REPORT, 1997 WORLD
RADIOCOMMUNICATION CONFERENCE 5 (1997) [hereinafter WRC-97 DELEGATION REPORT].
59 See supra text accompanying note 49.
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nology powers such as China and India increase and regional voting blocs as-
sume greater strategic importance in WRC deliberations.'
Prior to each WRC, the ITU sponsors a two-session Conference Preparatory
Meeting ("CPM") open to all ITU Member States and Sector Members.6 The
first of the two sessions normally takes place immediately following the previ-
ous WRC, and is devoted to organizing and coordinating the technical studies
that will provide the basis for action on various agenda items at the next Con-
ference.62 The second CPM session, which usually occurs during the twelve-
month period immediately preceding an upcoming WRC, produces a report on
the studies for consideration at the upcoming Conference.63 The United States
plays an active role in both CPM sessions as well as in numerous meetings and
working sessions that take place during the years between the two CPM ses-
sions.
Representatives of U.S. companies and non-governmental industrial or sci-
entific organizations join experts from the various federal agencies at the CPM
and in the work of ITU-R study groups through the Radiocommunication Sub-
committee of the United States International Telecommunication Advisory
Committee ("ITAC"). 4 The ITAC is an advisory body chartered to the De-
partment of State by the U.S. General Services Administration in accordance
with the Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA").65 Membership in the
Inter-American Telecommunications Commission ("CITEL")--the regional
60 See WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-2.
61 Administrative Circular, International Telecommunication Union to Administrations
of Member States of the ITU and Radiocommunication Sector Members, First session of the
Conference Preparatory Meeting (CPM 11-1) (July 2, 2007),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/wrc/WRC 201 1/Res.%20805%20WRC-
11%20Agenda.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
62 See 2005 NTIA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 57, at 7. The First Session of the Con-
ference Preparatory Meeting for WRC- 11 took place on November 19, 2007, just three days
after WRC-07 concluded. See Int'l Telecomm. Union, ITU-R Meeting Schedule,
http://www.itu.int/events/pastevents.asp?lang=en&sector=ITU-R (last visited Mar. 5, 2009).
63 The Second Session of the Conference Preparatory Meeting for WRC-07, which be-
gan on October 22, 2007, took place on February 19, 2007. See ITU-R Meeting Schedule,
supra note 62.
64 See International Telecommunications, http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/adcom.c668.htm
(last visited Feb. 8, 2009); Request for Comment on Improvements to the U.S. preparation
process for World Radiocommunication Conferences, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,646, 60,647 (Oct. 23,
2003), available at http://ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fmotices/2003/wrcrfc_ 10202003.htm.
65 The Federal Advisory Committee Act was enacted in 1972 to ensure that advice the
federal government receives from various outside advisory groups is rendered in an objec-
tive and transparent manner. U.S. Gen. Serv. Admin, Federal Advisory Committee Act,
Management Overview,
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?contentType=GSAOVERVIEW&conte
ntld=9673 (last visited Apr. 05, 2009); see Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act and Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 459-63
(1997).
[Vol. 17
Lessons Learned from the Spectrum Wars
organization for the Americas--also provides avenues for U.S. involvement in
international WRC preparations of a multi-national scope." First, the United
States can become a party to Inter-American Proposals ("IAPs") that CITEL
develops during regional preparatory meetings prior to the Conference. 7 The
United States can either initiate this process by attempting to have one or more
U.S. proposals become an IAP or join onto proposals initiated by other CITEL
members.68 Second, U.S. experts can attend preparatory meetings of other re-
gions by serving as CITEL observers. 9 At the last two WRCs, the U.S. part-
nership with CITEL has been an important element in attaining important U.S.
objectives."
Direct U.S. pre-conference outreach to individual ITU Member States is an
additional component of international WRC preparation. For past WRCs, this
effort has been carried out by the U.S. Head of the Delegation and a small
group of federal officials who are likely to hold leadership positions on the
delegation.' During the year preceding a WRC, the outreach team embarks on
a tour of capitals and major cities around the world for bi-lateral and multi-
lateral discussions with other ITU Member States.72 The team also conducts
discussions with foreign spectrum officials visiting the United States from
abroad.73 The Department of State is instrumental in planning the outreach itin-
erary, arranging the meetings, and funding the travel expenses of the Head of
Delegation and any State Department personnel on the trips. 4 Other agencies
with a significant stake in international spectrum matters also have borne the
travel costs of their officials and have defrayed delegation costs for meeting
rooms, meals, receptions, protocol gifts, and other items customarily associated
with such diplomatic trips. 5
The United States has reaped substantial benefits from participating in these
66 See International Telecommunications, supra note 64.
67 See CITEL, Results of the World Radiocommunication Conference,
http://www.citel.oas.org/ccp2-radio/WRC/WRC-2003.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2009).
68 In order to become an Inter-American Proposal for submission to an ITU World Ra-
diocommunication Conference, a draft Inter-American Proposal must have the support of at
least six CITEL member countries and must not be opposed by more than 50% of the num-
ber of supports obtained. See id.
69 See, e.g., Asia Pacific Telecommunity, The Ist APT Conference Preparatory Group
Meeting for WRC-2011 (APG201 1-1), http://www.aptsec.org/meetings/2008/APG11-
1/index.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) (explaining that non-members of APT can attend
meetings under an observer status).
70 See WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 16-17; WRC-03 DELEGATION
REPORT, supra note 44, at 21.
71 WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 14-15.
72 Id. at 2, app. B.
73 See id.
74 Id. at 14-15.
75 Id. at 15. NASA and the Department of Defense have been especially helpful in pro-
viding such support. Id.
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international pre-conference activities. Involvement in the ITU-sponsored
technical study groups not only gives the United States a voice in how the
studies are conducted, but also provides data useful in crafting U.S. proposals.
In addition, the study group setting enables U.S. officials to establish relation-
ships with their counterparts from other countries-a valuable asset in negoti-
ating and building international coalitions at the conference. U.S. participation
in such preparatory sessions facilitates the incorporation of U.S. views and
proposals in lAPs. This enhances the chances that U.S. proposals will reach the
WRC agenda and receive a more favorable reception at the Conference than
single-country proposals."6 Finally, regional preparatory meetings provide an
efficient and economical way for U.S. officials to meet with their counterparts
from many of the countries attending those conferences." Of course, all inter-
national preparation is done in accord with significant domestic preparation.
B. U.S. Domestic Preparation
1. Development of Positions and Proposals
At the same time that U.S. experts are participating in international prepara-
tions through the ITU study group process, the United States is engaged in de-
veloping its own positions and proposals for the Conference. This task initially
proceeds along two separate tracks. One track focuses on the spectrum needs
of the federal government and is led by the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration ("NTIA"). 8 The FCC leads the other track, which
focuses on spectrum needs of the private sector and other non-federal entities.79
As the federal agency with ultimate responsibility for U.S. international tele-
communications policy, the Department of State plays a key leadership role in
the overall preparatory process by advising on the general direction of the pro-
posals, monitoring their development, and convening or participating in meet-
ings involving proposal preparation."
In its role as coordinator of federal spectrum use, the NTIA must ensure that
76 Id. at 58-59. The multi-country nature of an lAP eliminates the need for a second and
thus ensures that the U.S. proposal included in the lAP will have a place on the agenda for
consideration by the Conference. See id. at 16-17.
77 Id. at 60.
78 See id. at 12-13.
79 Id.
80 For a more detailed description of the Department of State's traditional role in pro-
posal preparation, see Radio Frequency Spectrum and Military Needs: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Gov 't Reform, Subcomm. on Nat 'I Sec., Veterans' Affairs and Int'l Relations,
107th Cong. (2002) (statement of David A. Gross, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Int'l Commu-
nications and Information Policy), available at http://200 I -
2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/rm/2002/9898.htm [hereinafter Testimony of David Gross].
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U.S. positions and proposals to WRCs reflect the needs and concerns of Ex-
ecutive Branch agencies. For input in carrying out this function, the NTIA re-
lies on the Interdepartmental Radiocommunication Advisory Committee
("IRAC"), an advisory body chaired by the NTIA and comprised of representa-
tives of various federal agencies.8 The IRAC's Radio Conference Subcommit-
tee ("RCS") directs the effort, meeting monthly to develop recommended
WRC positions and proposals. 2 The IRAC does not have private sector or oth-
er non-federal members, principally because it is usually dealing with only
those portions of the spectrum allocated for federal use. 3 In addition, IRAC
members' interests in WRC agenda items sometimes can have implications for
national security or involve classified information." Nevertheless, interested
parties from the private sector or other non-federal entities can present their
views to the NTIA through the FCC, or can provide input directly to the NTIA
on an ad hoc basis. 5 When its task is completed, the RCS provides its recom-
mendations to NTIA for review, revision, and sharing with the FCC. 6
The FCC relies extensively on input from an official outside advisory group
in accordance with the FACA.87 Unlike the NTIA's IRAC-which consists
exclusively of representatives of federal departments and agen-
cies--membership of FCC WRC Advisory Committees ("WACs") is open and
includes many individuals from outside the federal government in addition to
FCC staff and observers from the NTIA. 8 As required by the FACA, the
membership of the WAC must "be fairly balanced in terms of points of view
81 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NAT'L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., MANUAL OF
REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES FOR FEDERAL RADIO FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT 1-6, 1-7
(2008) [hereinafter NTIA MANUAL]; Nat'l Telecomm. and Info. Admin., IRAC Functions
and Responsibilities, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/iracdefn.html (last visited Feb. 1,
2009). The IRAC fills the principal function of assisting the Assistant Secretary of Com-
merce for Communications and Information "in assigning frequencies to U.S. Government
radio stations and in developing and executing policies, programs, procedures, and technical
criteria pertaining to the allocation, management, and use of the spectrum." Id. Its members
are representatives of Executive Branch agencies such as the Departments of Energy,
Homeland Security, Justice, and Transportation; branches of the U.S. military; NASA; the
Federal Aviation Administration; and the National Science Foundation ("NSF"). Represen-
tatives of the FCC attend IRAC meetings as observers. NTIA MANUAL, supra, at 1-6 to 1-8.
82 2005 NTIA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 57, at 8.
83 See id. at 11.
84 Id. at 16.
85 Id. at 11 ("[T]he FCC voices non-federal views as a liaison representative in the
RCS.").
86 Id. at 14.
87 See CHARTER: ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2007 WORLD RADIOCOMMUNICATION
CONFERENCE 1 (2007), http://www.fcc.gov/ib/wrc-07/wac/waccharteramended.pdf [here-
inafter 2007 WAC CHARTER].
88 Id. at 3; see also CHARTER: ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2011 WORLD RADIOCOM-




represented and the functions to be performed by the advisory committee." 9
In addition, WAC proceedings must be transparent and must allow for input
from the public. Specifically, the WAC must give timely advance notice of its
meetings, which must be open to the public, and it must allow for public par-
ticipation.9" The WAC must keep minutes of its meetings, which also must be
open to public inspection.9 The FCC also publishes all WAC proposals, af-
fords the public an opportunity to provide written comments, and considers
such input in its further deliberations.92 The WAC's charter requires it to meet
at least four times per year on a quarterly basis, or at such other intervals as the
FCC decides.93 The WAC presents its recommendations to the FCC, which in
most cases shares draft proposals produced through its process with NTIA.94
Within the FCC-led process, the various companies, industry associations,
state and local governmental entities, and FCC officials inevitably have differ-
ent and sometimes conflicting objectives and interests. The governmental enti-
ties proceeding down the NTIA preparation track have differences of opinion
as well. Even though IRAC bylaws require members of the interagency
group--when in Committee-4o function "in the interest of the United States
as a whole,"95 their differences sometimes may cause them to view United
States' interest in dissimilar ways. Once the FCC and the NTIA have resolved
the internal differences in their respective proposal tracks and developed their
final positions and proposals for each WRC agenda item, the two agencies be-
gin to work in tandem to arrive at unified national positions and proposals.96
Melding all federal and non-federal positions and proposals into unified U.S.
proposals can prove challenging. While common ground is readily apparent on
some agenda items, other issues may require compromise in order to satisfy the
concerns of as many interested parties as possible. Occasionally the FCC and
the NTIA may be unable to reach agreement on a particular proposal. If such
an impasse occurs, a Principals Group consisting of high-level officials from
each key agency-along with the State Department-can intervene to bring
about a resolution.97
89 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(2) (2006).
90 § 10(a)(1)-(3).
91 § 1 0(b).
92 See, e.g., FCC Seeks Comment on Recommendations Approved by the Advisory
Committee for the 2007 World Radiocommunication Conference, Public Notice, 22
F.C.C.R. 127, 127 (Jan. 9, 2007).
93 2007 WAC CHARTER, supra note 87, at 3. Various WAC Informal Working Groups
meet in addition to meetings of the full WAC.
94 See WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.
95 NTIA MANUAL, supra note 81, at 1-6.
96 WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 12-14.
97 See id. The Principals Group for WRC-07, which consisted of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for International Communications and Information Policy, the Assistant
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The Department of State typically submits proposals, which the FCC and
the NTIA have agreed upon, to the ITAC's National Committee for review.98
Based on its review, the National Committee provides comments to the ITAC
membership, including the Department of State." The Head of Delegation, in
consultation with the State Department, then makes the final call on whether
each proposal constitutes a "final proposal" that can be submitted either to CI-
TEL for possible inclusion in a regional InterAmerican Proposal ("lAP") for
the WRC,' ° or directly to the ITU as a single-country proposal.' In cases
where a proposal lacks consensus or the Head of Delegation and the Depart-
ment of State otherwise deem it unsatisfactory, further efforts may be required
before the proposal can be sent forward to CITEL or the ITU.
As U.S. proposals approach finality, attention shifts to the formulation of
strategies for promoting U.S. objectives at the Conference. The leadership and
members of the U.S. delegation will bear responsibility for advocating U.S.
positions and proposals and for negotiating the inevitable compromises that
must be struck at the Conference. 2
2. Formation and Preparation of the U.S. Delegation
Success in achieving outcomes favorable to the United States requires strong
delegation leadership, capable and well-prepared delegates, and sufficient ad-
ministrative support.0 3 Ironically, the critical task of transforming a confedera-
tion of federal officials and private sector advisors into a unified and smoothly
functioning delegation is often one of the last major steps to be completed. It
typically occurs during the final twelve months of the WRC cycle, often only a
Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, the Chairman of the FCC, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, and the Deputy
Administrator of NASA, assisted in resolving differences and achieving a unified U.S. posi-
tion on several proposals. Id. at 13.
98 General Guidance Document: U.S. Participation in the ITU Radiocommunication
Sector, and in CITEL PCC II (Radiocommunication Including Broadcasting) §5 (2003),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/ib/sand/irb/guidance.html#_Toc461596060.
99 Id.
100 See World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-03), Procedures for the Prepara-
tion and Adoption of Interamerican Proposals to be Submitted to a World Radiocommunica-
tion Conference, http://www.citel.oas.org/ccp2-radio/WRC/WRC-
2003.asp#Procedures%20for/o20the%/20preparation/ 20and/ 20adoption/ 20of%'/o20Intera
meri-
can%20%20Proposals%20to%20be%20submitted%20to%20a%20World%20Radiocommun
ication%20Conference (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
101 WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 21 (discussing proposals the United
States submitted as a single-country proposal to the ITU).
102 See id. at 58 (discussing factors relevant to the United States' success at WRC-07




few months before the actual Conference begins."
3. Leadership of the U.S. Delegation
It is customary for each delegation to a WRC to designate one individual to
serve as its head.'0 5 While it is common practice in many countries for the posi-
tion to be filled by an incumbent senior official of a government telecommuni-
cations agency," the United States typically appoints a new head of delegation
for each WRC. °7 Furthermore, the individual heading the U.S. delegation is a
political appointee who frequently comes from outside either the federal gov-
ernment or the telecommunication sector.'° The head of the U.S. delega-
tion--who also serves as the official United States Representative to the Con-
ference and has the personal rank of United States Ambassador--typically
does not join the preparatory effort until the final year of a WRC cycle.0 9 In
order to dispense with the typically lengthy Senate confirmation process for
ambassadors, the U.S. WRC ambassadors are appointed pursuant to a statutory
provision that allows an individual to hold the rank of ambassador for a tempo-
rary period of no more than six months in connection with a special mission."'
This provision eliminates the need for Senate confirmation and requires only
that the President submit a written report to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee."'
4. Formation and Administration of the U.S. Delegation
Recent U.S. WRC delegations were made up of more than 150 experts from
both the federal government and the private sector." 2 During the twelve-month
104 See 2005 NTIA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 57, at 25. During the initial years
following a WRC, preparations for the next conference are led by international spectrum
experts at the key federal agencies. See, e.g., WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at
14-15; WRC-03 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 44, at 18-19.
105 See, e.g., WRC-07 Participants List, supra note 58 (identifying a head of delegation
for each Member State delegation accredited to attend the Conference).
106 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: BETTER COORDINATION AND
ENHANCED ACCOUNTABILITY NEEDED TO IMPROVE SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT 22-23 (2002)
[hereinafter 2002 GAO REPORT].
107 See 2005 NTIA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 57, at 26-29.
108 See id. at 28.
109 See id.
110 See 22 U.S.C. § 3942 (2006); see also 2005 NTIA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 57
at 31.
"I See 22 U.S.C. § 3942(a)(2)(B)(ii).
112 See, e.g., WRC-2000 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 58, at 7, 14 (reporting a dele-
gation of 162); WRC-03 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 44, at iii (reporting a delegation
of 167); WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at I (reporting a delegation of 157).
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period before the Conference, the State Department publishes a notice in the
Federal Register requesting interested parties to apply for inclusion on the del-
egation."3 As a practical matter, many applicants are already actively engaged
in the conference preparations by participating in ITU-sponsored technical stu-
dies, serving as observers at preparatory meetings of other world regions, and
participating on U.S. committees and working groups involved in formulating
positions and proposals."4 While many members of a U.S. WRC delegation
have previous international spectrum experience, the process remains open to
new participants as well."5 Following review of the submitted expressions of
interest by a panel of senior officials of the FCC, NTIA, and Department of
State, the State Department submits a list of prospective delegates to the Am-
bassador for approval, and forwards it to the White House for accreditation." 6
The Department of State then submits the list of accredited delegates to the
ITU for registration for the Conference. " '
As the Conference approaches, many delegates continue to serve on com-
mittees and working groups, and the delegation begins meeting periodically in
its entirety as a delegation.' 8 The Department of State has principal responsi-
bility for delegation administration, which includes the following responsibili-
ties: (1) obtaining and organizing meeting and workspace for the delegation at
the conference location; (2) setting up, provisioning, and staffing a delegation
office as well as private space and facilities for the Ambassador; (3) interfacing
with ITU and Conference officials; (4) arranging for communications between
the delegation at the conference and senior officials in Washington; (5) manag-
ing press relations and arranging press conferences; (6) ensuring adherence to
ITU and WRC procedures and requirements; and (7) advising on matters of
diplomacy and international relations." 9 Key federal agencies often contribute
by making personnel available to serve as staff for the Ambassador and sharing
certain administrative costs with the State Department.
113 See, e.g., Formation of the United States Delegation to the World Radiocomunication
Conference: Request for Expressions of Interest in Being on the United States Delegation,
72 Fed. Reg. 13,549, 13,549-50 (Mar. 22, 2007).
114 Of the 157 registered U.S. delegates to WRC-07, over half had participated in one or
more of the recently preceding WRCs. Compare WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note
4, at app. C, with WRC-03 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 44, at app. C, and WRC-2000
DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 58, at app. B.
115 See Formation of the United States Delegation to the World Radiocomunication Con-
ference: Request for Expressions of Interest in Being on the United States Delegation, 72
Fed. Reg., at 13,550 (listing U.S. citizenship as the only requirement to submit an expres-
sion of interest).
116 See WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 16.
17 See JOHN W. MCDONALD, JR., HOW TO BE A DELEGATE 7 (1984).
118 See, e.g., WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at app. E (establishing an
agenda for a U.S. delegation education and training session).
119 Testimony of David Gross, supra note 80.
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C. Issues and Recommendations Regarding U.S. Preparation for Participation
in WRCs
The United States' position as a world leader in the field of telecommunica-
tion, as well as the superior governmental and private sector resources it mar-
shals for WRC participation allows it consistently to achieve considerable suc-
cess in the international competition for radiofrequency spectrum.'20 As tele-
communication markets around the world continue to develop and global de-
mand and competition for a diminishing amount of radiofrequency spectrum
intensifies, a question arises: Can the Conference preparatory process and prac-
tices that have served the United States well in the past continue to be effective
in protecting U.S. interests today and in the future?
The increasing importance of telecommunications to the U.S. economy and
other vital national interests over the last three decades prompted Congress to
initiate several reviews of the WRC preparatory process and encouraged the
NTIA, FCC, and recent U.S. WRC delegations to undertake such assessments
as well.'2 ' Summaries of the conclusions and recommendations of these re-
views follow, with the added perspective of personal experience at the most
recent Conference, WRC-07.
In the course of an examination of international space activity in 1985, the
Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA")-a former Congressional advisory
body-noticed a growing interrelationship between U.S. and international
spectrum developments'22 and made international spectrum matters, including
the U.S. preparatory process for WRCs, a focus of subsequent reviews.'23
While the OTA found that U.S. preparations generally were effective, it
deemed the existing preparatory process reactive, lacking in long-range strate-
gic planning, and of dubious long-term value.'24 Three specific factors stand
120 See U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, THE 1992 WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE
RADIO CONFERENCE: ISSUES FOR U.S. INTERNATIONAL SPECTRUM POLICY 1 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter 1992 OTA REPORT] (describing the United States as "one of the world leaders in radio-
communication technology and policy").
121 See, e.g., id.
122 U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COM-
PETITION IN CIVILIAN SPACE ACTIVITIES 3-5 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 OTA, INT'L COOPERA-
TION]. The OTA was created in 1972, and "became world-renowned for its provision of
user-friendly scientific advice to members of Congress, and served as a model for the design
of science advisory mechanisms in many European parliaments." Chris Mooney, Science,
Delayed, SCIENCE PROGRESS, Jan. 9, 2008, http://www.scienceprogress.org/2008/0I/science-
delayed/print/. On September 29, 1995, the Office of Technology Assessment closed due to
congressional action withdrawing its funding. Office of Technology Assessment,
http://www.access.gpo.gov/ota/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2008).
123 See 1992 OTA REPORT, supra note 120, at 1; U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESS-
MENT, THE 1992 WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE: TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS 8, 149-157 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 OTA REPORT].
124 See 1992 OTA REPORT, supra note 120, at 3; 1993 OTA REPORT, supra note 123, at
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out among the weaknesses that the OTA identified: (1) a fragmented interna-
tional spectrum policy structure; (2) lack of continuity resulting from the ab-
sence of a permanent Head of Delegation; and (3) late selection of a Head of
Delegation and formation of the delegation, resulting in inadequate time for
effective preparation.
125
A Government Accounting Office ("GAO") review of U.S. spectrum man-
agement a decade later reported the continued existence of some of the very
same concerns. 26 Like the OTA, the GAO cited the adverse impact of the di-
vided U.S. spectrum policy structure on preparation for WRCs.
Under the current structure, FCC and NTIA develop positions on agenda
items through separate processes that involve the users of the spectrum they
manage. With the assistance of the Department of State, the positions are then
merged into a unified U.S. position. According to the GAO:
Timely preparation for these conferences is important to give the United States an op-
portunity to build support with other countries for its position on conference agenda
items. In the past, however, the U.S. position on some items has remained unresolved
until the eve of the conference, leaving the United States with little time to build pre-
conference support. 1
27
The GAO also expressed concern over the lack of continuity in the top lead-
ership of U.S. delegations and the typically short tenure of each U.S. WRC
Ambassador, which leaves inadequate time for pre-conference preparation.'28
Subsequent assessments by the NTIA and the U.S. WRC delegations echoed
these concerns.'29
1. Fragmented U.S. Structure for International Spectrum Policy
The OTA saw fragmentation of the U.S. governmental structure for interna-
tional spectrum policy as a problem for WRC preparation. In OTA's view, a
division of responsibility among three federal agencies-with no single gov-
ernment agency having a clear leadership role-was the principal cause of the
problem. 3° Furthermore, OTA found that the division of responsibility resulted
in a lack of clearly defined functions and roles and depended more on the
157.
125 See 1993 OTA REPORT, supra note 123, at 157-165.
126 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF U.S. SPECTRUM
MANAGEMENT WiTH BROAD STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT is NEEDED 2 (2003) [hereinafter
2003 GAO REPORT].
127 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 106, at 4.
128 Id. at 22-23 (noting also that the leadership of other countries' delegations serve
longer terms and "may represent their nations at multiple conferences").
129 See 2005 NTIA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 57, at 24-31; GAIL S. SCHOETTLER,
RECOMMENDATION TO IMPROVE UNITED STATES PREPARATION IN WORLD RADIOCOMMUNI-
CATION CONFERENCES § 7.1.3 (2000).
130 See 1992 OTA REPORT, supra note 120, at 4, 102.
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skills, experience, and personal relationships of particular individuals than on
formal institutional arrangements.' The absence of focused leadership and
sufficient engagement by top officials of each agency exacerbated the prob-
lem.1
32
Even with these structural flaws, U.S. preparations for recent WRCs have
demonstrated exemplary inter-agency and public-private sector cooperation.
Notwithstanding their different constituencies and spectrum objectives, the key
federal agencies involved in WRC preparation typically have displayed re-
markable professionalism, good nature, and mutual respect while hammering
out creative solutions and making a remarkable effort to reach consensus. 133
Participating agencies and private sector stakeholders alike generously con-
tribute time and resources to advance the U.S. effort.'34 Nevertheless, it is un-
clear whether a multifaceted, loosely-configured structure that depends to a
great extent upon voluntary cooperation and informal arrangements can con-
tinue to function effectively as global competition for spectrum escalates, the
stakes become higher, the issues become more complex, and the U.S. stake-
holders' interests become more divergent.
U.S. spectrum stakeholders and independent reviewers of the preparatory
process have offered a variety of proposals to address the lack of strong central
coordination in the current divided structure. Proposed solutions range from
incremental changes in the existing mechanism to major restructuring of both
the WRC preparation process and the federal government spectrum manage-
ment structure. 33 Modest adjustments-such as efforts to increase top level
agency involvement in WRC preparations-brought about some improvement
in the process but generally failed to eradicate the most significant shortcom-
ings of the divided structure.'36 On the other hand, internal restructuring of ex-
13 See id. at 13, 102-04.
132 See id. at 103.
133 See, e.g., WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 59 ("Without question, the
successful performance of the 2007 U.S. Delegation exemplifies the very best in interagency
cooperation and demonstrates how successfully the public and private sector can work to-
gether.").
134 See, e.g., id. at 15 (explaining the role of agency officials and private sector represen-
tatives in preparation for WRC-07); SCHOETTLER, supra note 129, §§ 1.2.9, 4.1 (discussing
the time and monetary resources expended by agency officials and private sector representa-
tives).
135 See, e.g., 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 106, at app. IV (Comments of Nancy J.
Victory, Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information, U.S. Department of
Commerce).
136 In 2003, for example, the FCC and the NTIA entered into a Memorandum of Under-
standing and Agreement relating to increased coordination to promote the efficient use of
the spectrum. The Agreement provided various measures including regular periodic meet-
ings of the respective agency heads and staffs. Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Federal Communications Commission and the National Telecommunications and Informa-
tion Administration 1-3 (Jan. 31, 2003), available at
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isting agencies or creation of a separate new agency for international spectrum
matters does not seem practical while federal government attention and re-
sources are focused on the troubled world economy and other significant na-
tional priorities.
Still, the United States cannot afford to put off the needed improvements to
the preparatory process until a more auspicious time when the necessary re-
sources are more readily available. Fortunately, certain vulnerabilities of the
current preparatory structure can be eliminated and other vulnerabilities can be
reduced significantly in the short term.
For example, the functions and roles of the principal agencies can be reex-
amined and more clearly defined. Their roles and relationships can be institu-
tionalized and formalized by reducing them to writing. Clearly articulated writ-
ten procedures and guidelines can reduce over-dependence on institutional
knowledge and accumulated experiences of specific individuals.
In its 2005 Report, the NTIA observed that many international spectrum
veterans on whom the U.S. preparatory effort currently relies are approaching
retirement.'37 The documents used to formalize and institutionalize all of these
arrangements can bolster the corps of experienced federal government profes-
sionals by training a new generation of international spectrum experts. Further,
while the international spectrum veterans consistently participate in prepara-
tion and representation at WRCs, a new Head of Delegation almost always
leads the U.S. delegation.
2. Lack of Continuity in WRC Leadership
Critics of U.S. participation in WRCs often place the lack of a permanent
Head of Delegation high on the list of problems.'38 For instance, a 2003 Center
for Strategic and International Studies report raised concern over permitting an
international spectrum negotiation as important as the WRC to be led by a
temporary U.S. ambassador with only a few months to prepare for the Confer-
ence. 139 Other critics argue that having a different individual head the U.S.
delegation to each WRC deprives the U.S. delegation of necessary continu-
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fccfilings/2003/fccntiamou_01312003.pdf.
137 2005 NTIA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 57, at 37; see 1992 OTA REPORT, supra
note 120, at 102 ("The cadre of spectrum policymakers in this country is small, and many of
the most experienced U.S. international radiocommunication experts will retire in the next 5
to 10 years.").
138 See 2005 NTIA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 57, at 26.
139 CSIS COMMISSION ON SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT, SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT IN THE
21 ST CENTURY 18 (2003) ("The nation has been fortunate in its choice of ambassadors to the




ity.4° Moreover, critics point out that the existing process of having a U.S. am-
bassador serve as Head of Delegation fails to put a leader in place until just
months before the Conference begins.'4 ' Critics argue that the United States
should follow the approach commonly used by other nations and fill the posi-
tion with an incumbent senior civil servant.'42
The career civil servant model has some drawbacks. Although it creates the
possibility of having an experienced individual head the U.S. delegation to
repeated WRCs, it provides no guarantee.'43 Thus, the practice within the cur-
rent model of having experienced WRC veterans from the federal government
in key leadership positions at every level of the delegation may be nearly as
effective in ensuring continuity from conference to conference. Furthermore,
for all their potential benefits, long incumbencies also have some disadvan-
tages.
Sometimes the close relationships that develop among delegation heads over
many years can breed too much familiarity, discouraging exploration and for-
mation of beneficial new alliances. A new leader can bring fresh perspective to
the process and may be more willing to forego familiar but unpromising
courses of action for more effective, bold new approaches. The success of
emerging coalitions among the nations of the Americas, Africa, and Asia in
overcoming traditional European dominance in the quest for globally harmo-
nized spectrum for International Mobile Telecommunication at WRC-07 dem-
onstrates that receptivity to new alliances and innovative approaches may
prove more successful in achieving spectrum goals at WRCs than will strict
adherence to longstanding alliances and familiar strategies.'" Moreover, the
predictability that brings comfort to U.S. allies and adversaries also might
eliminate the element of surprise that can be advantageous in negotiations. Fi-
nally, presidential selection of the Head of Delegation also helps to ensure that
140 See 2005 NTIA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 57, at 25-26.
141 See id. at 24-25; CSIS COMMISSION ON SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT, supra note 139, at
18; 22 U.S.C. § 3942(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006). The President may only appoint the U.S. WRC
Ambassador to serve for six months including the WRC. See id. Because the timeframe is so
short, some critics argue that the Ambassador-who is always a political appointee-lacks
opportunities to become sufficiently educated and form crucial relationships, potentially
hindering the negotiating power of the United States. See id. at 18.
142 See, e.g., 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 106, at 22-23 (noting that some believe that
the Heads of Delegations of other countries are better able to form relationships with coun-
terparts from other nations).
143 See 2005 NTIA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 57, at 26. NASA advocated that the
designated senior civil servant's term "should be for as long as he or she serves in that ca-
pacity. . . [but] this person may be a political appointee and therefore, long-term leadership
continuity may not be guaranteed." Id.
144 See WRC-07 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 31; Scott Billquist, Americas
Unite on Frequencies for IMT; Tough Talks Ahead, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Nov. 9, 2007,
at 9 (referencing CITEL's "first unified proposal").
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WRC outcomes support and advance the administration's telecommunication
and technology goals.'45
3. Inadequate Time for Preparation
Lack of adequate time for preparation is potentially the most serious flaw in
the current U.S. practice for selecting heads of WRC delegations. Reviews of
the current process agree that involving the individual who will serve as prin-
cipal U.S. WRC negotiator in formulating proposals, positions, and strategy as
early as possible is imperative for effective U.S. preparation. 46 In addition, the
Head of Delegation must have adequate time for pre-conference interaction
with key ITU officials and counterparts from other countries' delegations.
Given the month-long duration of WRCs, the current practice of having a
six-month temporary ambassadorship for the U.S. Head of Delegation limits
his or her availability for preparation to only five months. In addition, because
the Head of Delegation has a role in selecting members of the delegation, the
current process also delays formation of the delegation until dangerously late
in the process.'47 Although key federal officials can participate actively in
WRC preparation before they officially become delegates, the role of prospec-
tive private sector participants is limited until they are accredited.' In addi-
tion, late formation of a delegation deprives the United States of the necessary
time for the entire delegation to learn to work effectively as a unit.
Even with these procedural complications and delays, having an ambassador
as Head of Delegation has advantages worth preserving. An ambassador lends
considerable prestige to the delegation, commands a great degree of respect
from other delegations, and affords the United States access to the highest-
level officials from other ITU Member States, both before and during the Con-
ference.'49 From time to time, reviews of the U.S. preparatory process suggest
an alternative process that offers a possible solution to this problem.
First, the President can designate an individual to serve initially as the offi-
145 See 2005 NTIA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 57, at 31; 2002 GAO REPORT, supra
note 106, at 22.
146 See, e.g., id. ("The current six-month tenure of the Ambassador does not allow
enough time for the Ambassadors to develop sound working relationships with other coun-
try representatives or complete the necessary delegation activities for which they are respon-
sible."); SCHOETTLER, supra note 129, § 7.4 ("If possible, a position should be found for that
person even earlier [than six months before a WRC] that enables her or him to learn about
spectrum management and to establish relationships with the domestic and international
spectrum players in government and industry.").
147 See 2005 NTIA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 57, at 30.
148 See id. at 29-30.
149 See 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 106, at 22; see also 2005 NTIA RECOMMENDA-
TION, supra note 57, at 29.
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cial U.S. Representative and Head of Delegation without the rank of ambassa-
dor. In that way, the individual can take on leadership duties well before the
six-month ambassadorship begins. 5 ° As a second step, the rank of ambassador
can be conferred on the U.S. Representative and Head of Delegation effective
six months before the conclusion of the conference. 5' The additional funds
needed to support the Head of Delegation's longer tenure seem warranted by
the benefits this approach would bring to the U.S. preparatory process.
The White House currently holds the key to ensuring that WRC preparations
have effective leadership starting early in the process. Given the importance of
the Conference's outcome, the process should start with early selection of a
person having appropriate skills and experience. A telecommunication or tech-
nology background, familiarity with spectrum and other wireless telecommu-
nication issues, experience coordinating a multi-agency federal initiative, and
previous exposure to international forums are extremely beneficial characteris-
tics of an ideal Head of Delegation. A Head of Delegation with those attributes
will need less training and can assume a leadership role more rapidly.'52 Senior
officials of U.S. stakeholder agencies can assist with this process by conveying
the needs and timing of the process to the President's technology and tele-
communication advisors early in the planning stages. Finally, a timeline based
generally on the process used for forming recent WRC delegations-with
some additional time built in at the front end-should be formalized, memori-
alized, and followed for future WRCs.
V. INCORPORATION OF ITU RADIO REGULATIONS INTO DOMESTIC
LAW: THE STEP OF TREATY RATIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Due to the treaty status of the Radio Regulations,'53 ITU Member States
must comply with certain formalities in order to be bound by the new and re-
150 See 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 106, at 23.
151 See 2005 NTIA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 57, at 24-25. In order for the desig-
nated individual to fully engage in the duties of a head of delegation, he or she might be
required to be a federal employee in advance of receiving the ambassadorship. Bringing in
an individual from outside government, although possible, requires a much earlier start and
therefore would be more difficult.
152 This trend began with the President's appointments of U.S. Heads of Delegation to
WRC-03, Janice Obuchowski, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Administrator
of the NTIA, and to WRC-07, Richard Russell, the incumbent Associate Director of the
Office of Science and Technology of the Executive Office of the President. People Profile:
Janice Obuchowski, THE POINT (U.S. ITU Assoc., Washington D.C.) Apr. 2003, at 13,
available at http://www.usitua.org/newsletter/ThePoint-Apr2003.doc; Office of Science &
Technology Policy: Richard M. Russell, available at http://www.ostp.gov/galleries/default-
file/rmrbioPdf.pdf.
153 INT'L TELECOMM. UNION CONST. art. 4.
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vised Radio Regulation adopted by a WRC.'54 ITU Conference procedures es-
tablish that the Final Acts of the Conference must be signed by a duly author-
ized member of each delegation participating in the WRC, which customarily
occurs during the WRC closing ceremony.'55 For formal agreements, the act of
signing imposes at most an obligation to "refrain from acts that would defeat
the object and purpose of the agreement."'56
Under international law, each ITU Member State participating in the Con-
ference can be bound by the revised Radio Regulations by taking such addi-
tional steps as are required by its own domestic law. 57 Thus, for the United
States and many other countries, signing the Final Acts serves mainly as an
indication that the negotiations have concluded and that absent the submission
of any declaration, understanding, or reservation to the contrary, the delegation
from the signing state generally approves the measures adopted.'58 Just as the
United States must have measures in place that facilitate effective pre-
conference preparation for its participation in the international spectrum rule-
making process at WRCs, it also must adopt policies that ensure timely com-
pliance with U.S. legal requirements to incorporate WRC treaty provisions into
domestic law and regulation after a WRC concludes.
A. Background of the U.S. Treaty Ratification Process
1. Origins of U.S. Treaty-Making Process
Article II, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution (the "Treaty Clause") vests au-
thority for treaty-making in the President, but gives the Senate an important
role in the process: "[The President] shall have Power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Sena-
tors present concur." '59 While the President has authority to negotiate, con-
clude, and ultimately ratify treaties, the Treaty Clause requires that a treaty go
154 Id. art. 6.
155 ITU Rules of Procedure, supra note 32, art. 28. For the United States, authority to
sign customarily rests with the U. S. Ambassador to the WRC who serves as the official
U.S. Representative to the Conference. This authorization must be specifically requested in
writing in accordance with the Department of State's Foreign Affairs Manual. 11 U.S. Dep't
of State Foreign Affairs Manual §§ 722, 724.3 (2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/88317.pdf.
156 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 312
cmt. i (1986).
157 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 11-17, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
158 See id. at 335-35; see also ITU Rules of Procedure, supra note 32, art. 27-28 (stating
final approval and signature requirements).
159 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
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through several additional steps before final ratification; obtaining the Senate's
advice and consent to Presidential ratification is foremost among them. 60
Historians attribute the Treaty Clause in part to the political environment at
the time of the drafting of the Constitution. 6 ' Like other provisions of the Con-
stitution, the Treaty Clause reflects the Framers' concern over unchecked Pres-
idential power.'62 In fact, the Drafters initially placed authority over foreign
relations exclusively in the legislative branch, with a prominent role for the
President arising only later in the drafting process.'63 Providing a role for both
the executive and legislative branches also may have resulted from attempts to
ensure U.S. compliance with its international agreements, improve the young
nation's reputation for reliability in international affairs, and encourage U.S.
treaty partners' adherence to agreements.' The requirement of treaty approval
by a two-thirds majority of the Senate-rather than by both houses of Con-
gress-reflects historical concern with protecting less populous southern
states' influence over free trade and immigration.'65
The Treaty Clause also reflects the very different conditions prevailing in
administration of the U.S. government during the founding era. In 1791, the
nation's population was just over four million,66 and the federal government's
entire expenditures for the three-year period from 1789 to 1791 totaled only
$4.3 million.'67 As a young nation, the United States typically entered into a
total of only around twenty to thirty international agreements per year.'68 Be-
160 Unlike consent, which is mandatory, obtaining Senate advice regarding a treaty is
viewed as somewhat discretionary. In practice, presidents seldom have formally sought the
Senate's advice prior to negotiation and conclusion of a treaty. Moreover, to the extent that
the Senate provides advice, it rarely does so in advance. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 n.3.
161 See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End. The Past, Present, and Future of
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1282 (2008) (explaining
that the Treaty Clause was a "direct response to a recent controversy over treaty negotiations
with Spain in the Continental Congress").
162 See generally Arthur Bestor, "Advice" From the Very Beginning, "Consent" When
the End Is Achieved, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 718, 724-25 (1989) (explaining the process of creat-
ing the Treaty Clause at the Constitutional Convention, and that while the president has a
role in the treaty process, he or she does not replace the Senate).
163 Id. at 721-24.
164 Hathaway, supra note 161, at 1276-77.
165 Id. at 1281-82.
166 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLO-
NIAL TIMES TO 1970 8 (1975).
167 Id. at 1104. In contrast, the total U.S. population at the end of 2007 was approxi-
mately 302 million, while the total U.S. budget outlays for fiscal year 2007 were approxi-
mately $2.7 trillion. U.S. Census Bureau, USA Statistics in Brief: Population by Sex and
Age, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/files/pop.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2009);
U.S. Census Bureau, USA Statistics in Brief: Social Welfare, and Law Enforcement,
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/files/govtsoclaw.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
168 Hathaway, supra note 161, at 1356.
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cause conducting international affairs was not considered especially demand-
ing, early U.S. Secretaries of State also had responsibility for keeping the ar-
chives of all federal government documents.'69 Moreover, the State Depart-
ment's initial budget contemplated that it could carry out all of its responsibili-
ties with only a Secretary, Under Secretary, two clerks, a French interpreter, a
doorkeeper, and a messenger. 7° As a smaller and less populous nation, the U.S.
Senate had only thirty members, 7 ' and its responsibilities also comprised but a
fraction of the business that it conducts today. With only thirty members of the
Senate, obtaining the Senate's advice and consent to treaty ratification would
not have been a major burden. The same, however, is not true today.
2. Traditional Steps in the U.S. Treaty Ratification Process
Senate advice and consent remains a mandatory component of the current
ratification process under the Treaty Clause. 7 2 After treaty negotiations are
concluded, in its role as the principal foreign relations agency of the Executive
Branch, the Department of State prepares a package for the Secretary of State
to use in formally submitting the treaty to the President.'73 This package con-
tains three documents: (1) a certified copy of the treaty text; (2) a detailed
summary and analysis of the treaty; and (3) a proposed treaty message from the
President requesting the Senate's advice and consent to ratification.'74 After
reviewing and approving these documents, the President transmits a package to
the Senate that consists of a letter of transmittal containing the treaty message,
a certified copy of the treaty text, and usually, a copy of a separate document
containing the Secretary of State's treaty summary and analysis.'75
For a non-controversial treaty that presents no extraordinary circumstances,
169 See GRAHAM H. STUART, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE: A HISTORY OF ITS ORGANIZA-
TION, PROCEDURE, AND PERSONNEL 14-15 (1949).
170 Id. at 15.
171 U.S. Senate: Art & History, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/
one item and teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
172 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
173 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE
ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 118 (2001) [hereinafter SENATE TREATY STUDY]. The
Congressional Research Service undertook this comprehensive study at the request of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to "provide a reference volume for use by the U.S.
Senate in its work of advising and consenting to treaties." Id. at xi.
174 Id. at 118.
175 See, e.g., Message of the President of the United States transmitting 1992 Partial Re-
vision of the Radio Regulations (Geneva, 1979), with Appendices, signed by the United
States at Malaga-Torremolinos on March 3, 1992 (the "1992 Partial Revision") Together
with Declarations and Reservations of the United States as Contained in the Final Acts of
the World Administrative Radio Conference for Dealing with Frequency Allocations in
Certain Parts of the Spectrum (WARC-92), Sept. 30, 2002, S. TREATY Doc. No. 107-17
(requesting Senate consent to the 1992 WARC treaty).
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the Senate proceeds essentially in accordance with the following steps: (1) the
Presiding Officer of the Senate refers the matter to the Committee on Foreign
Relations after one reading; (2) the Committee conducts a public hearing and
produces a written report; (3) the Committee conducts a mark-up of the treaty;
and (4) the Committee reports the treaty favorably for consideration on the
Senate floor.176 Following a final vote on the resolution with two-thirds of the
Senate approving, the Senate returns the signed resolution of ratification to the
White House, which in turn sends it on to the Department of State to prepare
an appropriate instrument of ratification for the President's signature.
77
After signing the instrument of acceptance indicating the formal declaration
of U.S. consent to be bound by the treaty, the President directs the Secretary of
State to take such additional action as needed for the treaty to enter into force
internationally.' For a WRC treaty, this next step entails depositing the signed
document with the ITU Secretary General.' The process concludes with a
Presidential proclamation that the treaty has entered into force, which "serves
as legal notice for domestic purposes and publicizes the text."'' ° While the
process seems straightforward, the variety of steps combined with the growing
number of treaties considered annually-as described below--requires modifi-
cation for the modem world.
3. Treaty Ratification in a Changing World
Over the years, U.S. involvement in international affairs has greatly ex-
panded, producing a corresponding increase in the number of treaties to which
the United States has become a party.' As of January 29, 2008, the United
176 See SENATE TREATY STUDY, supra note 173, at 119-24. At times, certain steps are
foregone in order to speed final approval. However, the process can become considerably
more complex when the substance of a treaty is inherently controversial, when there is a
disagreement within the Senate, when the President and the Senate do not agree, or when
circumstances change between signing and ratification. The Senate Treaty Study outlines
additional procedural measures that apply in circumstances such as when the Senate de-
clines to give its consent, agrees to do so only with certain conditions, fails to act on a treaty
before the end of the session, or when a new President who does not support a particular
treaty takes office after the Senate gives its consent but before the preceding President has
ratified the treaty. Id. at 123-24.
177 Id. at 143.
178 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 312 n.4
(1986).
179 INT'L TELECOMM. UNION CONST. art. 54.
180 SENATE TREATY STUDY, supra note 173, at 12.
181 See SENATE TREATY STUDY, supra note 173, at 124; Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional
Approval of Treaties By the U.S. Senate, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 89, 91 (1996)
(explaining that relatively few treaties actually are entered into under the advice and consent
process).
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States had diplomatic relations with 190 of the world's independent states.'82
The Senate gave advice and consent to twenty-three treaties during the 110th
Congress alone, 3 and twenty-six additional treaties remained pending in the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee as of September 26, 2008.184
Further, the State Department's general workload has expanded and become
more complex. In addition to managing U.S. relations with each of the 190
independent states with which the United States has diplomatic relations, the
Department of State also participates in the multinational affairs of each of the
various international organizations to which the United States belongs. 8 Thus,
the Treaty Clause method of treaty ratification has become much more burden-
some and time-consuming.
As a result of the numerous treaties that come before it for advice and con-
sent, the Senate adopted special procedural measures to expedite the process.'86
This prompted the following characterization from the Congressional Research
Service in the 2001:
Contrary to past characterizations of the Senate as the "graveyard of treaties," the
overwhelming majority of treaties receive favorable Senate action within a reasonable
period of time. Few treaties languish indefinitely or are returned to the President with-
out approval, and even fewer are defeated outright by vote of the Senate.... In most
cases, the process of Senate consideration is expedited, without using the full proce-
dures available under the Senate rules, and Senate approval frequently is unani-
mous.
187
While these procedures may expedite the approval process for many treaties,
ITU treaties face special impediments.
B. Unique Issues Pertaining to ITU Treaties
1. Impediments to Timely Ratification
It is easy to see how each stage of the treaty ratification process leading to
the Senate proceedings might contribute to the delay. The package that the
182 U.S. Dep't of State, Independent States of the World,
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2009).
183 The Library of Congress, Treaties, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/treaties/treaties.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2009) (select "110th Congress," click "Search").
184 U.S. Dep't of State, Treaties Pending in the Senate,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/pending (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
185 See U.S. Dep't of State, Department History, http://history.state.gov/
department+history (last visited Mar. 15, 2009); U.S. Dep't of State, Chiefs of Mission,
http://history.state.gov/department+history/people/chiefsofmission (last visted Mar. 15,
2009).
186 See Kennedy, supra note 181, at 91; SENATE TREATY STUDY, supra note 173, at 117-
18.
187 SENATE TREATY STUDY, supra note 173, at 117-18.
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State Department prepares for the President's submission to the Senate re-
quires careful preparation and several levels of review.'88 The submission is
reviewed by the State Department's Office of the Legal Advisor for Treaty
Affairs, the NTIA, FCC, and other major stakeholders in the federal govern-
ment.'89 The reviewers must determine whether the government should con-
tinue to support any reservations, understandings, or declarations made by the
WRC Delegation at the time of signing the Final Acts of the Conference, and
whether any additional reservations should be added prior to Senate considera-
tion. 9 ' After the package reaches the White House, it must compete with other
pressing matters of national importance for the attention of top advisors and
eventually the President. 9 '
After reaching the Senate, telecommunication treaties often move slowly,
even if they are relatively uncontroversial.'92 At the beginning of each session
of Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requests the State De-
partment to provide a ranking of priority of all the treaties pending before the
Senate.'93 Telecommunication treaties do not always fare well when in compe-
tition for priority with other treaties covering such matters as arms control,
commerce, environment, extradition, intellectual property, investment, taxa-
tion, and terrorism.'94 Telecommunication treaties that result from revision of
the ITU Radio Regulations may be at an additional disadvantage in obtaining a
high priority from the State Department or prompt attention from the Senate
relative to other pressing issues.
As a practical matter, the United States can benefit from new international
spectrum allocations and other measures before a WRC treaty enters into force
simply by taking regulatory action to implement new policies and practices.'95
Thus, the United States has avoided the traditional lag time between the con-
clusion of WRCs and U.S. ratification of treaties by proceeding with imple-
mentation of WRC measures before--sometimes years before-official treaty
ratification occurs. 96
188 See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
189 Testimony of David Gross, supra note 80.
190 Id.
191 See SENATE TREATY STUDY, supra note 173, at 118.
192 See id. at 123 (noting that some treaties may "languish on the committee's calendar"
due to lack of importance or "want of interested advocates with the time to do justice to
them").
193 Id. at 122.
194 See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, 2008 Treaty Actions,
http://www.state.gov/s/lUtreaty/c26244.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2009) (listing monthly trea-
ty actions).
195 The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, specifically allows for the domestic
enforcement of the international Radio Regulations, thus permitting such advance imple-
mentation. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(r), 902(b)(2) (2000).
196 See, e.g., Testimony of David Gross, supra note 80.
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Another potential level of delay can occur once a treaty reaches the Senate
floor. Given the highly politicized atmosphere that has existed in Washington
in recent times, it is conceivable that obtaining Senate consent to treaty ratifi-
cation could be used as a tactical bargaining chip in the same way obtaining
Senate confirmation for federal judges and other presidential appointments has
been employed.'97 Moreover, with the super-majority required for approval, a
relatively small group of Senators whose views may not reflect those of the
majority of their colleagues--or the country at large--can block or indefinitely
delay approval of a treaty.
98
Further delay can occur during the final steps of ratification, after the Senate
has given its advice and consent. Although the State Department had over
34,000 employees as of the end of 2007,99 only a limited number of lawyers,
treaty analysts, protocol specialists and subject matter experts are involved in
preparing instruments of ratification for the President's signature. °0 Even after
an instrument of ratification reaches the White House, other pressing matters
may prevent the President from signing it immediately. While telecommunica-
tions treaties do not rise to the same level of political concern as treaties gov-
eming other issues, there are significant consequences to failing to ratify tele-
communications treaties.
2. Consequences of Failure to Ratify
Even though the United States technically need not wait for a WRC treaty to
be ratified in order to implement revised Radio Regulations,"' there are disad-
vantages to allowing the treaty embodying those revisions to remain un-
ratified. First, if the United States is not bound by the particular Radio Regula-
tion provision, it may not be afforded the protection from harmful interference
from radiocommunication emanating from other nations granted by the par-
ticular Radio Regulation. Despite the ITU's lack of authority to enforce treaty
provisions, parties to a dispute have recourse to an arbitration procedure out-
197 See PAUL C. LIGHT, OUR TOTTERING CONFIRMATION PROCESS (2002),
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2002/springgovemance light.aspx?p= 1 (last visited
Feb. 24, 2009) (indicating that forms of delay include, but are not limited to, complex in-
spection processes, substantial red tape, and secret holds).
198 SENATE TREATY STUDY, supra note 173, at 19.
199 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2008 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL
CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT BY BRANCH AND AGENCY: 1990 TO 2007, available at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/09s0481.pdf.
200 Many of these individuals work in the State Department's Office of the Legal Advi-
sor under the supervision of the Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty Affairs. See U.S. De-
partment of State: Treaty Affairs, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/index.htm (last visited Apr.
14, 2009).
201 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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lined in the ITU Convention, and the ITU can also use its offices informally to
assist in resolving cases of interference among parties to WRC treaties.2 It is
not clear that these measures would be available to a Member State that is not
bound by the provision it seeks to invoke. Furthermore, because other nations
look to the United States for leadership in telecommunications and technology,
U.S. behavior indicating a lack of regard for international order could encour-
age other countries to become outliers, to the detriment of interference-free
radiocommunication everywhere. 3
Failure to ratify treaty obligations that the United States has actively pro-
moted and to which it has agreed, may also prove politically embarrassing.
This situation arose in 1998 on the eve of an important ITU Plenipotentiary
Conference that the United States was to host in Minneapolis. 4 Under the ITU
Constitution, a country is denied the right to vote in the ITU if it has not rati-
fied the treaty constituting the organization's basic acts. °5 In this case, such a
treaty was pending, and the United States found itself in the awkward position
of hosting a major world convention at which it could not vote.0 6 The United
States avoided an extremely awkward situation only by taking extraordinary
action to ratify the treaty at the eleventh hour. 7 Thus far, the United States has
escaped any serious harm from the potential threats described above, but there
is no assurance that its good fortune will continue.
3. Delays Becoming a Habit
The problem of untimely ratification has arisen not so much from objections
to specific new or revised Radio Regulations as from administrative delay dur-
ing the ratification process.2 0 Nevertheless, ITU telecommunication treaties in
202 Id. at art. 56.
203 See Aldo Forgione, Weaving the Continental Web: Exploring Free Trade, Taxation,
and the Internet, 9 LAW & Bus. REV. OF AM. 513, 558 (2003) ("The United States is recog-
nized as the world leader in electronic commerce, telecommunications, and information
technologies.").
204 See Govt. and Industry Push Senate Approval of ITU Treaty to Regain U.S. Vote,
COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Sept. 18, 1997 (explaining that the Senate had to act quickly on
ratifying a 1992 treaty in order to give the United States the right to vote at the upcoming
1998 Plenipotentiary meeting).
205 INT'L TELECOMM. UNION CONST. arts. 3(2)(b), 52.
206 Govt. and Industry Push Senate Approval of ITU Treaty to Regain US. Vote, supra
note 204.
207 See id.
208 See Treaties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. (2008)
[hereinafter Lugar & Beaird Colloquy] (colloquy between Sen. Richard Lugar and Richard
C. Beaird, Senior Deputy United States Coordinator for International Communications and
Information Policy, Bureau for Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, Department of
State).
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general-and WRC treaties in particular-have remained unratified by the
United States for years, with some pending for over a decade following the
conclusion of a Conference.?° Specifically, telecommunication treaties dating
from 1992, 1998, and 2002 were not approved by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee until September 2008."0 Moreover, additional WRC treaties con-
cluded in 1997, 2000, 2003, and 2007 had not yet been transmitted to the Sen-
ate for approval."'
When four of these long-pending treaties finally came before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee at a hearing on July 10, 2008, Senator Richard
Lugar, the Committee's ranking member, noted that over a decade had passed
since two of those treaties were concluded. 2 In response, the senior official
testifying for the State Department acknowledged the State Department's
awareness of the time lapse and stated that the delay in bringing the treaties to
the Senate was attributable in part to competing priorities within the Depart-
ment."' The official also reported that the State Department was seeking ways
to expedite the process internally as well as through discussions with the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee staff.2 4 Ultimately, telecommunications trea-
ties as a whole did receive some attention from the Senate, which took action
to expedite ratification of telecommunications treaties.
C. The 2008 Senate Response
In light of the importance of the Radio Regulations to the United States and
the considerable investment in the process of obtaining favorable worldwide
conditions for radiocommunication, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
reassessed the customary process for WRC treaties and announced a new ap-
209 The time taken for ratification of nine ITU telecommunications treaties in force for
the United States as of January 2007 averaged slightly over five years. Ratification for indi-
vidual treaties took from three years to eleven years, with two treaties each requiring over a
decade to be ratified. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2007
172-78 (2007), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/89668.pdf
210 Partial Revision (1992) of the Radio Regulations (Geneva, 1979), Mar. 3, 1992, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 107-17; Amendments to the Constitution and Convention of the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union (ITU) (Geneva, 1992), Nov. 6, 1998, S. TREATY Doc. No.
108-5; 1995 Revision of Radio Regulations, Nov. 17, 1995, S. TREATY Doc. No. 108-28;
2002 Amendments to the ITU Constitution and Convention, Oct. 18, 2002, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 109-11.
211 See U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Pending Treaties,
http://foreign.senate.gov/treaties.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009) (as updated Jan. 15, 2009).





proach following its treaty hearing in July 2008."5 The new approach replaces
the Treaty Clause method-and its requirement of advice and consent of the
Senate-with future ratification by executive agreement:
In the course of reviewing the 1992 Revision and the 1995 Revision, the committee
has given consideration to whether future revisions to the Radio Regulations will re-
quire the advice and consent of the Senate. Revisions to the Radio Regulations are
technical implementing instruments anticipated in the ITU Constitution, which are
expected to regulate the international use of telecommunications and are subject to the
provisions of the Constitution and Convention. Given the nature of these instruments,
the committee believes that in the future, revisions to the Radio Regulations will not,
in the normal course, require the advice and consent of the Senate. Thus, in the future,
the committee does not expect the Executive to submit for advice and consent revi-
sions to the Radio Regulations.216
As an additional safeguard, the Committee established the following condi-
tion:
If there is any question, however, as to whether a revision goes beyond the current
mandate of the Radio Regulations as anticipated in the ITU Constitution, the commit-
tee expects the executive branch to consult with the committee in a timely manner in
order to determine whether advice and consent is necessary.2 7
Due to the delay and other disadvantages inherent in the Treaty Clause me-
thod of ratification, a number of commentators over the years have supported
elimination of Senate advice and consent for all but a small number of trea-
ties.2"8 One authority refers to the Senate's constitutional role under the Treaty
Clause as irrelevant and simply a product of historical concerns of slavehold-
ing states.2' 9 Still others find the process overly cumbersome and unworkable
given the modem day workloads of the State Department, the President, and
the Senate.220 Dispensing with the process of obtaining Senate advice and con-
sent seems to be the surest alternative for expediting and improving the ratifi-
cation process.
The United States has used executive agreements as an alternative to treaties
under the Treaty Clause in certain circumstances in the past. 2 ' As a result, U.S.
reliance on executive agreements has been used for international agreements in
215 See S. EXEC. REP. No. 110-18, at 7-8 (2008).
216 Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Note that the Committee did not propose the new approach
for amendments to the ITU Constitution and Convention resulting from Plenipotentiary
Conferences. Id.
217 Id. at 9.
218 See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 161, at 1241-42 (advocating for most treaties to be
approved through congressional-executive agreements).
219 Id. at 1239-40 ("Rooted in now-irrelevant (and discredited) concerns of slaveholding
states, overtaken by actual political practice almost from the Constitution's beginning, the
Treaty Clause was the product of circumstances that have little continuing relevance.").
220 See Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non) Treaty Power, 77 N.C.
L. REv. 133, 235 (1998).
221 SENATE TREATY STUDY, supra note 173, at 5 (discussing congressional-executive
agreements and Presidential or sole executive agreements).
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a variety of fields.2 ' This Article supports the use of executive agreements as a
superior approach for bringing new and revised Radio Regulations into force.
Depending on the circumstances, each of the following three types of execu-
tive agreements can serve as an alternative to the traditional Treaty Clause rati-
fication method. First, congressional-executive agreements based on authority
explicitly or implicitly conferred by statute, or that obtain separate approval by
a majority of both houses of Congress, can replace the formal advice and con-
sent process. Second, and perhaps more efficient, sole executive agreements
that can be executed by the President under independent authority granted by
Article II of the Constitution can replace the advice and consent process. Fi-
nally, the President can issue executive agreements pursuant to treaty, which
derive legitimacy from the text--or reasonable inference from the text-of an
existing treaty."2
The Committee's new approach provides a welcome improvement for rati-
fying revised Radio Regulations adopted by a WRC. Using an executive
agreement promises to eliminate many of the problems inherent in the existing
post-WRC process. Dispensing with the requirement of obtaining advice and
consent of the Senate in most cases has the significant practical advantage of
removing opportunities for delay that can arise at various points in the Treaty
Clause ratification process. Departing from a strict requirement for Senate ad-
vice and consent also forecloses a minority of Senators from blocking ratifica-
tion of measures that have wide support in Congress, and throughout the coun-
try. Given a highly charged partisan atmosphere of modem politics, using an
executive agreement also insulates international telecommunications agree-
ments from use as bargaining chips in the confirmation process for Presidential
appointees or in legislative fights over measures unrelated to the WRC. Fi-
nally, removing WRC agreements from the long queue of treaties awaiting
Senate advice and consent in the usual case would permit the Senate to focus
on significant treaties resulting from ITU Plenipotentiary Conferences224 as
well as important treaties in other areas of international endeavor.2
At this point, it is not clear with which type of executive agreement the For-
eign Relations Committee intends to replace the advice and consent process.
The congressional-executive agreement, which requires approval in both hous-
222 Hathaway, supra note 161, at 1298.
223 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303
(1986); see SENATE TREATY STUDY, supra note 173, at 79, 86-87.
224 The treaty amendments adopted at ITU Plenipotentiary Conferences typically affect
important provisions of the organic documents containing the Union's mission and the
rights and responsibilities of its Member States. INT'L TELECOMM. UNION CONST. art.
8(2)(a)(i).
225 See SENATE TREATY STUDY, supra note 173, at 26 (discussing the Senate's concern
that the "most important international commitments" be made as treaties).
20091
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
es of Congress, certainly can be ruled out in light of the Committee's concern
with eliminating delay. 26 Either of the remaining two forms of executive
agreement--4he sole executive agreement or the executive agreement pursuant
to treaty--seem appropriate and well-suited to bringing WRC actions into
force for the United States. However, such executive agreements may engen-
der opposition because they lack direct legislative involvement as a counter-
balance to the President's power. While extensive use of such alternatives may
not be advisable for all types of international agreements, their use for ratifying
revised ITU Radio Regulations should not raise serious concern.
Any individual WRC often results in certain adjustments and updates to the
tables, operating standards, and procedural measures that the ITU Radio Regu-
lations contain. 27 Because Radio Regulations are similar to federal regulations
that administrative agencies and regulatory commissions are authorized to
promulgate in order to implement statutes,228 direct congressional involvement
in their ratification does not seem necessary. Either of these two forms of ex-
ecutive agreement should be suitable to bind the United States to WRC meas-
ures in the circumstances the Foreign Relations Committee cited, so long as the
revised Radio Regulations are consistent with provisions of the organic docu-
ments of the ITU that the United States previously has ratified.29
Other aspects of U.S. participation in WRCs provide additional assurance of
the appropriateness of the new approach of forgoing formal Senate advice and
consent. Measures built into the U.S. preparation process ensure that agree-
ments resulting from U.S. participation in WRCs are free of the abuses that the
Treaty Clause was intended to prevent. 3° The three U.S. government agencies
with principal responsibility for formulating WRC positions and proposals
have formal mechanisms in place for obtaining public input.' The presence of
150 public officials and private sector representatives on U.S. WRC delega-
tions, and the process used to select them, provides additional assurance of
openness.232 In the past, members of Congress and senior staff of House and
Senate committees also have attended WRCs and observed both U.S. delega-
tion meetings and Conference deliberations.233 Finally, the U.S. Head of Dele-
gation keeps federal officials and the American public informed of progress
226 See supra Part V.B.3; Lugar & Beaird Colloquy, supra note 208.
227 See supra Part lI.B.
228 S. EXEC. REP. No. 110-18, at 6-7 (2008).
229 See id. at 9 (explaining that if revision "goes beyond the current mandate of the Radio
Regulations" the executive should consult with the Committee).
230 See supra Part IV.B.
231 See supra Part IV.B. I.
232 See supra Part IV.B.4.
233 See WRC-03 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 44, app. C (listing Congressional staff
and advisers).
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during the Conference by providing regular briefings, holding press confer-
ences, and issuing a detailed post-conference report on the measures adopted
and how they met U.S. objectives. 34
The Senate's new approach should eliminate U.S. vulnerability during leng-
thy periods when revised Radio Regulations remain unratified. In addition, the
safeguard of requiring consultation in the event of doubt as to whether revi-
sions to the Radio Regulations are inconsistent with the ITU Constitution and
Convention will ensure that the powers of the executive and legislative
branches remain in balance. Under the new approach, the executive branch will
have greater responsibility for ensuring that revised Radio Regulation revisions
are brought into force promptly. Forgoing the Senate advice and consent proc-
ess will eliminate multiple reviews and minimize substantial post-conference
paperwork, allowing the NTIA and the FCC to focus on domestic implementa-
tion of new international spectrum measures and preparations for the next Con-
ference.
VI. CONCLUSION
International cooperation remains indispensable to communication in the
twenty-first century. In 1982, ITU historian George Codding observed, "[t]he
work of the ITU is more than merely desirable, it is mandatory. The continued
existence of the ITU or its equivalent is no doubt assured as long as there are
nation-states. '235 Without question, Codding's observation remains both accu-
rate and relevant in the information age, with telecommunication at the heart of
the global economy.
In order to remain a force within the ITU and at future World Radiocommu-
nication Conferences, the United States cannot limit its effort to the Confer-
ence itself, but must continue to make improvements in how it carries out the
important tasks leading up to and coming out of each WRC. U.S. preparation
for a WRC must begin on both the international and domestic levels as early as
possible and should make effective use of all available governmental and pri-
vate sector expertise, talent, and resources. Following each WRC, the United
States also must be conscientious in seeing that new and revised Radio Regula-
tions that are beneficial to U.S. spectrum stakeholders are promptly incorpo-
rated into domestic law and regulation. U.S. spectrum stakeholders-whether
in government or the private sector--should constantly look for opportunities
to contribute to those efforts and to ensure that U.S. international spectrum
policy and structure continues to be updated and adjusted as necessary to
achieve the best results.
234 See WRC-2000 DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 58, at 21.
235 CODDING & RuTKOWSKI, supra note 9, at 55.
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